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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
PHILLIP 0. AUSTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 940739-CA 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for kidnaping, a second-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995). This Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(f) (Supp. 
1995). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW l 
1. Whether defendant's appellate challenges to the lesser-included jury 
instruction on kidnaping and the special interrogatory on use of a firearm are 
waived due to his failure to object to them at trial or claim plain error or 
1
 Although defendant sets out five issues in its "statement of issues" section, 
(Brief of Defendant at 1-2), his brief argues only three of them. Therefore, this Statement of 
Issues does not necessarily correlate with defendant's. For the convenience of the Court, the 
State will point out the corresponding point headings in its brief. 
ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal? This issue was not before the trial court; 
therefore, no standard of review applies. 
2. Did the trial court properly give the jury the option to find defendant 
guilty of kidnaping as a necessarily-included offense? This Court reviews the 
giving of a lesser-included offense instruction as a matter of law. State v. 
Simpson, 904 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah App. 1995). 
3. Was the jury's finding that defendant did not use a firearm 
inconsistent with its guilty verdict on kidnaping or require limiting instructions. 
This issue is reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 238 
(Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are included in the addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
On April 20, 1994, the State charged defendant with aggravated kidnaping 
for "intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of 
2 
[C.C.], by any means and in any manner, seized, confined, detained or 
transported [C.C.], with intent to commit a sexual offense . . . and in the 
commission thereof used a firearm" (R. 1). Before trial, the State requested that 
the court give the jury an instruction on kidnaping as a "necessarily-included 
offense" of aggravated kidnaping (R. 70). During an in-chambers conference 
after presentation of evidence, the court informed the State and defendant's 
counsel that it was going to give the State's requested "lesser-included offense" 
instruction (R. 967). Defendant did not object (id.).2 The record also does not 
indicate any objection to the trial court's special interrogatory on the use of a 
firearm (id*.). 
The jury convicted defendant of kidnaping but found that he had not used a 
firearm in the commission of the offense (R. 121, 128). Approximately one 
month later, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the court construed as a 
motion for new trial (R. 949-55). The court denied the motion and sentenced 
2
 Defendant's proposed amended statement of the issues presented on appeal, 
filed in response to the State's motion to strike, does not satisfy the Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, requirement that the Statement of Issues provide "citation to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Defendant's amended 
statement includes this parenthetical information: "See Record on Appeal, State's Proposed 
Jury Instructions and Briefs in Support of Motion to Dismiss." (Attached as Addendum B). 
Given that the record consists of three district court files and 11 volumes of transcript, citation 
to the "record on appeal" is particularly unhelpful. 
3 
defendant to an indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years (R. 256). 
Defendant has been free on a certificate of probable cause pending resolution of 
this appeal (id.). 
Statement of Facts 
On March 12, 1994, C.C.3, an adult man, was waiting for a bus on 300 
North Main in Clearfield when defendant drove up and asked for directions to the 
Freeport Center (R. 293). After C.C. gave him directions, defendant said he did 
not think he could find it so he asked where McKay-Dee Hospital was located 
and eventually offered C.C. a ride to Riverdale Road, 5300 South, where C.C. 
wanted to go (R. 289-92). Defendant introduced himself with a false name (R. 
294) and they began conversing primarily about C.C.'s upcoming training as a 
Navy SEAL (R. 295). In approximately the area of 5600 South and 1900 West, 
defendant announced to C.C. that he was gay and asked if it would offend him if 
"I asked to give you a blow job." (R. 307). In response, C.C. immediately said 
yes, it would offend him: "I believe I flared up a little bit, turned towards him 
and said: Please pull over, in a real ~ not real hostile, but in a somewhat hostile 
manner'' (R. 307). Because defendant was driving in the slower, right-hand lane 
3
 Even though the name of the victim is a matter of record, because the subject of 
this offense is sexual in nature, the State prefers to refer to the victim by his initials so as to 
better protect his privacy. 
4 
and could have pulled over (R. 308). Instead, defendant pulled a gun out from 
his left side, put it across his lap, continued to drive and said, "We're going to 
my place" (R. 308, 601).4 Defendant continued driving, going past Riverdale 
Road at 5300 South, where C.C. wanted to be driven to (R. 327). 
When defendant was telling C.C. to "[rjelax, it's always toughest the first 
time, you're going to like this,'' C.C.'s anxiety grew and he thought about how 
to get out of the situation (R. 327, 330). When defendant had to slow down at 
4800 South and 1900 West because a car was turning ahead of him, C.C. opened 
the car door and jumped out (R. 330, 601). C.C. hit the ground hard and 
skidded but was able to get up and quickly cross the road (R. 330). C.C.'s 
escape caused him to have a sprained right wrist and road rash on his elbows (R. 
343). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claims on appeal that the trial court erred by instructing the 
jury on the lesser-included offense of kidnaping and by giving an interrogatory on 
use of a firearm are not properly before this Court because defendant did not 
object at trial. Because defendant has not claimed plain error or exceptional 
4
 Though C.C. testified to defendant's pulling out a gun, one was never 
introduced into evidence and the jury ultimately found that a firearm was not used in the 
commission of the crime (R. 121). 
5 
circumstances in his brief, defendant's failure to preserve below precludes raising 
these issues now. This analysis also applies to defendant's appellate claim that 
the trial court should have given the jury an instruction on unlawful detention as a 
lesser-included offense. 
Here, the trial court's giving of the lesser-included offense instruction did 
not prevent defendant from having adequate notice of the charges against him or 
an opportunity to present a defense. Defendant's defense to aggravated 
kidnaping, i.e., that he did not detain C.C., was the same as his defense to 
kidnaping. Further, the term "substantial" as used in the kidnaping statute is not 
a quantitative measurement, a qualitative term that distinguishes the act of 
kidnaping from conduct incidental to underlying crimes. Other jurisdictions also 
interpret "substantial period" in the context of kidnaping as not requiring 
clockwork certainty in time. 
Defendant's challenge to the special interrogatory is misplaced principally 
because the interrogatory response is not inconsistent with the ultimate verdict. 
Use of a firearm is not required to commit a kidnaping, only a detention. 
Further, courts must reconcile "inconsistent" jury verdicts whenever possible due 
to the insulation courts give to jury verdicts on review. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
APPELLATE REVIEW BECAUSE HE FAILED TO 
OBJECT IN THE TRIAL COURT AND BECAUSE 
HIS BRIEF DOES NOT PRESENT APPROPRIATE 
ARGUMENT OR ANALYSIS UNDER RULE 
24(a)(9), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE.5 
A. The record does not show that defendant 
objected either to the kidnaping 
instruction or the special interrogatory 
regarding use of a firearm; therefore, 
defendant has waived Lis right to appeal. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred when it acceded to the 
State's request to give the jury an instruction on the lesser-included offense of 
kidnaping. Brief of Defendant at 6-13. Defendant also challenges the court's 
decision to give the jury a special interrogatory regarding use of a firearm on the 
grounds that it "confused'' the jury. Brief of Defendant at 13. However, 
nowhere in his brief does defendant specify where he preserved either of these 
issues in the trial court. Indeed, the State does not find any objection either in 
the transcripts or in the court's file.6 Under these circumstances, defendant's 
3
 This point addresses a fundamental error in defendant's case that relates to all 
three of his point headings. 
6
 Defendant's brief states that the lesser-included instruction was allowed in only 
over the "strenuous objection of the defense" Brief of Defendant at 9. On the contrary, the 
7 
appellate claims fly in the face of the long-standing principle that claims raised 
for the first time on appeal will not be heard absent plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. State v. Lahrum. 881 P.2d 900, 903 (Utah App. 1994) (due to 
defendant's failure to object to jury instructions, "defendant will not now be 
heard to complain that the judge erroneously instructed the jury."), cert, granted 
892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). Defendant has not argued plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. Therefore, he has waived his right to challenge the court's 
actions on appeal. 
record does not establish that defendant objected. Therefore, if defendant objected at some 
point before or during the trial, it must have happened during a portion of the trial that was 
not transcribed for this appeal. Pursuant to rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
defendant has the responsibility to provide "all evidence relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal." Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis in original); 
see also State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App. 1992) (when adequate record not 
available, [appellate court] presumes "correctness of the disposition made by the trial court."). 
Without an objection in the record, the Court must presume no objection was made. 
8 
B. Defendant has not presented meaningful 
argument or analysis to support his 
claims that the trial court erred by 
refusing to grant the motion to dismiss 
and failing to give a lesser-included 
offense instruction on unlawful 
detention; therefore, defendant's 
challenges should not be considered. 
In his Statement of Issues, defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to 
grant his motion to dismiss and failure to charge the jury with the lesser-included 
offense of unlawful detention. Brief of Defendant at 1-2. However, the body of 
defendant's brief mentions these issues only in passing (Brief of Defendant at 15-
16), by saying that the court could have "redeemed" its errors by granting the 
motion to dismiss and by claiming in conclusory fashion that the court should also 
have included unlawful detention as a lesser offense. IsL 
These conclusory statements do not establish the necessary argument and 
analysis required by rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because 
of this fundamental problem, these issues do not deserve the Court's attention. 
State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Price. 827 P.2d 
247, 249 (Utah App. 1992). 
9 
H. EVEN IF THIS COURT REACHES THE MERITS 
OF THE APPEAL, IT SHOULD REJECT 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS BECAUSE KIDNAPING 
IS INCLUDED IN AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING 
AND THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORY DID NOT 
LEAD TO AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT.7 
A. Because the State gave defendant proper 
notice of its intent to seek a conviction 
for kidnaping as a lesser-included 
offense, and because the facts established 
kidnaping, the trial court properly gave 
the instruction. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's jury instruction on kidnaping as a 
lesser-included offense of aggravated kidnaping on the basis that kidnaping is not 
a " necessarily-included offense" under State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 
1983). In Baker, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the "necessarily included 
offense" standard where the prosecution requests a lesser-included offense 
instruction. Baker. 671 P.2d at 156. Under that standard, for kidnaping to be 
necessarily included in aggravated kidnaping, the "offenses must be such that the 
greater [aggravated kidnaping] cannot be committed without necessarily having 
committed the lesser [kidnaping]." LL This standard also has a factual prong 
This argument responds to all point headings in defendant's brief. 
10 
requiring that the "actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate those 
elements must necessarily be included within the original charged offense." M,. 
This "necessarily included" test developed to ensure a defendant his due 
process right to notice of the charges against him. Both Baker and other cases 
cited in that decision focus on the notice requirement. In State v. Howell. 649 
P.2d 91, 95 (Utah 1982), cited favorably in Baker, the Court stated that it would 
be a "travesty" to acquit simply because the lesser-included crime was not 
charged. 
[W]hen evidence of a defendant's criminal conduct has 
been placed before a court of justice, even though that 
conduct has not been specifically charged, it would be a 
mockery of our criminal laws for a court to ignore a 
proved crime and acquit on the charged crime, when 
the defendant is not prejudiced in presenting a full 
and complete defense to the proved crime. 
Howell. 649 P.2d at 95 (emphasis added). After noting the importance of being 
able to convict for a lesser-included offense, the Court also stated that, with that 
definition, notice would not be a problem: "[ujnder the Utah definition of lesser 
included offense, there can be no unfairness to the defendant in giving a lesser 
included offense instruction because of lack of notice or preparation since no 
element may be included in the lesser that is not included in the greater offense." 
LL From the language in Baker and Howell
 T the "necessarily included offense" 
11 
standard takes on the appearance of a prophylactic rule, designed to ensure notice 
in all cases rather than a minimal standard required by the constitution itself. 
Baker. 671 P.2d at 156 (standard "ensures the defendant the notice and 
opportunity necessary to prepare his defense"). 
Here, kidnaping does not so closely fit within the Baker analysis as to 
constitute a statutorily-defined necessarily included offense of aggravated 
kidnaping. Aggravated kidnaping does not require that detention last for a 
specific period of time. State v. Perry. 899 P.2d 1232, 1242 (statute does not 
"require the victim be detained or restrained for any period of time"). On the 
other hand, kidnaping mandates proof that detention or restraint occurred for a 
"substantial period of time." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995); State v. 
COiicli, 635 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1981); Perry. 899 P.2d at 1241. 
Nevertheless, the policy concern that underscored the Howell and Baker 
necessarily included tests is not present here. First, the State proposed jury 
instructions on September 6, 1994, one-day before trial, that included kidnaping 
as a lesser-included offense (R. 70). Defendant did not object and the trial court, 
pre-trial, ruled that the jury would be instructed on kidnaping. This ameliorated 
the concern expressed in Howell that a person could not defend against charges 
"not specified until the jury is instructed." Howell. 649 P.2d at 95. Second, 
12 
defendant denied any detention, substantial or not (R. 774-75), and, therefore, his 
defense was not affected by the addition of the kidnaping charge. If the jury had 
believed his story, they could not have convicted on the kidnaping charge either. 
This is unlike a hypothetical case where a person has been charged with one 
crime, rape, and then is prosecuted at trial for something completely different, 
like theft. Defendant knew before the trial began what acts the State believed he 
committed. Those acts constituted kidnaping and, if the jury had believed 
defendant had an intent to commit a sexual offense, it would also have constituted 
aggravated kidnaping. Defendant was not harmed because his defense to the 
greater charge, aggravated kidnaping, i.e., that there was no detention, 
necessarily included a complete defense to the lesser charge of kidnaping. 
Defendant claims that the period of time during which he detained C.C. 
was insufficiently "substantial" to constitute kidnaping under Couch. This 
argument is misplaced because it misconstrues "substantial" as it is meant in 
Utah's kidnaping statute and those of other jurisdictions with similar provisions. 
The Utah Supreme Court refused to make a "hard and fast" rule in Couch, ruling 
instead that the term "substantial period" could be defined only by reference to a 
specific fact situation." Couch, 635 P.2d at 93. In Couch, the substantiality test 
was easily met because the defendant drove the victim from Evanston, Wyoming 
13 
to Coalville, Utah. However, the Court's refusal to set a rule manifested its 
determination that a long time period as not necessarily required to meet the 
substantiality test. 
Here, the detention began when C.C. demanded his release, at 
approximately 5600 South 1900 West in Roy. $££ Cfiuch, 635 P.2d at 92 
("kidnaping begins when the detention begins to be "against the will of the 
victim."). It ended only when C.C. jumped out of the car at 4800 South. 
Adopting defendant's view that this time period is to insubstantial to constitute 
kidnaping, however, leads to absurd results: rewarding those who detain the 
strong and fleet of foot who can readily escape, while punishing only those 
criminals who prey on the weak or timid.8 Such a result cannot be the intent of 
the legislature. 
The correct definition of "substantial period of time" is reflected in Couch 
and in cases from other states that use the same language. The language can be 
traced to the Model Penal Code where the drafters were concerned with the 
tendency of prosecutors to charge kidnaping when the detention consisted solely 
8
 The Pennsylvania Superior Court echoed a similar sentiment when it said, 
a[c]ertainly, the guilt of an abductor cannot depend upon the fortuity of the distance he has 
transported his victim nor the length of time elapsed before the ransom is paid." 
Commonwealth v. Hughes. 399 A.2d 694, 696 (Pa.Super. 1979). 
14 
of a rape or robbery. Model Penal Code §212.1, Comment (Tent.Draft No. 11, 
p. 14, 1960). Under the model code's statute, a person commits kidnaping "if he 
unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business, or a 
substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found, or if he unlawfully 
confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation. ..." LL 
Substantiality was intended not so much to place a minimum time limit on the 
detention, but to differentiate it from an underlying crime that also consisted of 
detention. In construing its kidnaping statute, substantively identical to the Model 
Penal Code provision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the addition of 
the "substantial period" language was "intended to exclude from kidnapping the 
incidental movement of a victim during the commission of a crime which does 
not substantially increase the risk of harm to the victim. Commonwealth v. 
Hughes. 399 A.2d 694, 697 (Pa.Super. 1979). The New Jersey Supreme Court 
similarly held in State v. LaFrance. 569 A.2d 1308, 1311 (N.J. 1990) when it 
said that the phrase "confinement for a substantial period" was a "qualitative 
term by which the Code distinguishes kidnapping from conduct that is merely 
incidental to the underlying crimes." 
Whereas defendant construes "substantial" in a quantitative sense, the 
proper reading of the term focuses on its qualitative sense, i.e., how the 
15 
"quality" of the detention differed from that incidental to another crime. 
Whether a period of time is "substantial" cannot be answered with "mathematical 
certainty," LaFrance. 569 A.2d at 1311, nor can it be resolved by "linear 
measurement" State v. Arp. 644 A.2d 149, 150 (N.J. Super. 1994). What is a 
"substantial period" may even depend on the mental state of the victim. Hughes, 
399 A.2d at 697. The New Jersey Supreme Court developed a useable definition 
of substantial period in LaFrance when it concluded: 
[0]ne is confined for a substantial period if that 
confinement is 'criminally significant in the sense of 
being more than merely incidental to the underlying 
crime,' and that determination is made with reference 
not only to the duration of the confinement, but also to 
the 'enhanced risk of harm resulting from the 
[confinement] and isolation of the victim [or others]. 
That enhanced risk must not be trivial. 
LaFrance. 569 A.2d at 1313. This definition commends itself not only because it 
precludes reliance on a stopwatch, but also because it directs attention to the 
aspect of kidnaping that deserves criminal sanction, i.e., a detention over and 
above that of a host crime either in time or quality enhances the risk of harm to 
the victim. 
With these cases in mind, the best way to interpret "substantial period of 
time" may be via the negative, i.e., a "not-insubstantial period of time," or a 
16 
non-trivial period of time. This is so especially in a case such as this, in which 
kidnaping is not associated with a host or underlying crime, but stands by itself. 
Thus, it is the fact that a detention occurred, which was not trivial in time, that 
constitutes a kidnaping. Seen from this perspective, defendant's detention of 
C.C. was not insubstantial or trivial. Defendant told C.C. they were "going to 
my place," drove past C.C.'s requested destination of 5300 South, and pointed a 
gun at him. The period of time during which this occurred was not insubstantial, 
certainly not to C.C, and it increased the risk of harm to C.C. because it took 
him out of his usual domain and placed him in a circumstance of risk. The mere 
"fortuity" that C.C. escaped by jumping from a moving automobile should not 
"make a mockery of our criminal laws" and require the court to "ignore a proved 
crime and acquit." HQEEII, 649 P.2d at 95. 
Defendant had full notice of the charges of which he might be convicted; 
the pre-trial request to charge the jury with of the lesser-included offense did not 
detract from defendant's ability to defend himself or prejudice his defense to the 
greater offense, aggravated kidnaping charge. Additionally, the factual part of 
the Baker necessarily included test is fully met as the facts needed to demonstrate 
the non-trivial detention are included in the facts that would be needed to prove 
the aggravated kidnaping. Under these circumstances, the inclusion of kidnaping 
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met both the factual and notice requirements of Baker. Therefore, the trial court's 
lesserincluded offense instruction was proper and should be affirmed. 
B. The trial court's special interrogatory on 
use of a firearm did not lead to an 
inconsistent verdict nor did it require 
limiting instructions. 
The information charged defendant with using a firearm, not as an element 
of aggravated kidnaping but for purposes of sentence enhancement (R. 1). The 
Court gave the jury a special interrogatory on this question and the jury found 
defendant did not use a firearm (R. 121). Defendant argues that mis finding is 
inconsistent with the jury's finding him guilty of kidnaping and requires reversal. 
Brief of Defendant at 10-16. However, defendant does not explain how he 
reaches this conclusion. The Court explained to the jury the elements of 
aggravated kidnaping and kidnaping and that the State had to prove those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 107 (jury instruction)). Because neither 
kidnaping nor aggravated kidnaping require use of a firearm, the jury's separate 
finding that defendant did not use a firearm is not inconsistent. 
Defendant seems to argue that the only circumstance exposing defendant to 
risk of serious bodily injury, as required under kidnaping, was the use of a gun; 
therefore, since the jury found no gun was used, the serious bodily injury prong 
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of kidnaping could not be established. However, as the State already has 
discussed, the mere fact that defendant was kept in a moving car and his only 
means of escape was by jumping out also is a circumstance that exposed him to 
risk of serious bodily injury. Thus, even if defendant did not use a gun, the jury 
reasonably decided that defendant's conduct still exposed C.C. to risk of serious 
bodily injury. Indeed, this is what the prosecutor argued. 
Further, when a jury's decision on an interrogatory is logically inconsistent 
with its overall guilty verdict, a criminal does not necessarily obtain reversal. 
Since 1931, when the United States Supreme Court decided Dunn v. United 
States. 284 U.S. 390, the judiciary has not interfered with jury verdicts due to 
inconsistencies. As the federal supreme court later explained in United States v. 
Powell. 469 U.S. 57, because of the reluctance to "inquire into the workings of 
the jury, and the possible exercise of lenity" jury verdicts are "insulated" from 
review on grounds of verdict inconsistency. Powell. 469 U.S. at 69. The Utah 
Supreme Court has affirmed this principle by instructing courts "not to presume 
inconsistency" but to "seek to reconcile the answers [in special verdicts] if 
possible." Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson. 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985); 
Rasmussen v. Sharapata. 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1995). 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for kidnaping should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLICATION REQUESTED 
The State believes oral argument would significantiy enhance the decision-
making process because of the procedural complexity of this case. The State 
does request publication unless the Court disposes of this case on the grounds of 
waiver. 
lixiL: day of! RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS I ft ^   f February 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 1/ jmfi fa 14 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode - Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate 
trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned 
on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not 
be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so included 
when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal 
or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the 
offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included 
offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of 
conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is 
sought by the defendant. 
(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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76-5-301. Kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or 
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; 
or 
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parent or guardian. 
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the second degree. 
(c) 1953-1996 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping [Effective April 29,1996]. 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any means and in any manner, 
seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a third person to 
engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or 
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function; or 
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result offeree, threat, or deceit if the victim is 
mentally incompetent or younger than 16 years and the detention or moving is accomplished 
without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco 
parentis to the victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable on or after April 29, 
1996, by an indeterminate term of imprisonment at not less than 5 years to life. 
(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
